It isn't enough to simply remember

November 11th is Remembrance Day. A time when we are to pause and think upon the sacrifice that those in uniform have sacrificed in our name so that we could live in peace and security. This day of remembrance may have begun with the ending of world war one, but it encompasses all those who have fought and died in war from then till now. It is to be a symbol that we who benefit from their sacrifice will not forget their struggle or needlessly and ignorantly ask that they sacrifice all that they have on our behalf. Remembrance Day is  both a time of reflection and promise. "Lest we forget" and "never again."

I've been fortunate enough to have never had to put my life on the line. I've never been in war or had to suffer its effects. I have an ancestor that won the Victoria Cross. When I was young I met a man who won the Victoria Cross. I had a grandfather who suffered the effects of war. Hearing their stories is a powerful experience. One should never be asked to sacrifice so much if there isn't a dire or urgent need. We should not abuse their willingness to sacrifice on our behalf. We should not betray their trust.

Which is why Canada's involvement in Afghanistan is a shameful reminder of how we too often fail our soldiers. 

We've heard it said that the commitment was driven by the military. But Bercuson and Granatstein reveal that Foreign Affairs and CIDA were enthusiastic hawks and that there was a strong desire in cabinet both to please the U.S. and elevate Canada's international influence. 

The study also has a hint of something more sinister. 

Some months before the then Liberal cabinet discussed sending in a force of any size — and this was a minority government, remember — at least one senior U.S. general in NATO told a Canadian liaison officer that Ottawa had told Washington it would send in a battle group. 

Where exactly did that promise originate from, and on what basis could it have been made? These are just some of many mysteries crying out for investigation. 

The big one, of course, is why the Paul Martin government in 2006, and then the Stephen Harper one just months later, failed so spectacularly to recognize the risks they were allowing our troops to face. 

As these two historians point out, Ottawa was gambling that our soldiers would be well supported in Kandahar by NATO, even though senior Canadian officers attached to NATO were already warning that our European allies were putting "caveats" on their troops. 

These were restrictions that would limit their ability to fight and make them dangerously undependable, as events quickly proved. 

In short, Ottawa put great faith in an alliance that its own military distrusted, and Ottawa was dead wrong.

As we now see, Canada committed itself to Kandahar, home of the Taliban, without even conducting a serious intelligence study of the area and, incredibly, without taking into account Kandahar's long undefended border with Pakistan, which proved to be a sanctuary for insurgents. 

The report quotes an early Canadian commander in Afghanistan, Gen. David Fraser, saying "Nobody was collecting information on Pakistan. Pakistan was a black hole. I went to various agencies in Ottawa and said can you help me and they said no, but we'll change our collection plan" and try to find you more intelligence. 

Still, Ottawa did not hurry. According to U.S. officials, Canada didn't increase its intelligence effort in the region for two more years, when CSIS, the Canadian Security Intelligence Service, became involved. 

Even military intelligence that resourceful officers were able to pick up from their U.S. colleagues was often ignored. 

The first Canadian commander to go in, Col. Ian Hope, had been briefed by his U.S.  colleagues to expect a Taliban surge that first summer. Yet a blasé Ottawa refused to give Canadian troops their own helicopter support for medical evacuation, something that had to be begged from the Americans.

The full report can be read here.